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Abstract
According the linguistic relativity hypothesis, the language one speaks affects how one
thinks. Because languages differ in how they categorize color, linguistic relativity has often been
tested by conducting experiments on color perception and memory. This study examines the
linguistic relativity hypothesis using ecologically valid stimuli: pictures of eyes. Because Russianspeakers are more likely to describe blue/grey eyes as grey, whereas English speakers are more
likely to describe them as blue, English and Russian participants were asked to match the
overall color of blue eyes to a color scale. There were three conditions. In the first condition
(perception), participants saw the color scale and an eye picture simultaneously and then chose
the color that best matched the picture. In the second condition (memory), participants
matched the color of an eye to the color scale from memory. The third condition (label) was
similar to the second, except participants labeled the eye orally before matching the color from
memory. A 3 (condition) x 2 (language) ANCOVA and Bayesian analysis were used to analyze the
data. Overall, the ANCOVA and Bayesian analysis indicated that there was a main effect of
language. Russian-speaking participants were more likely to rate the eyes as greyer than
English-speaking participants. The Bayesian analysis also suggested that there may also have
been an interaction, with Russian and English-speaking participants rating the eyes similarly in
the perception condition, but not the memory or labeling conditions. Overall, the findings
provide novel evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis.
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Chapter One
Introduction
The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis
I have tested the linguistic relativity hypothesis by examining how native Russian and
English speakers perceive and remember eye color. The linguistic relativity hypothesis is an idea
that evolved over time based largely on the work of Benjamin Whorf in the first half of the
twentieth century. Whorf was never formally trained in linguistics. He studied chemical
engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and worked at the Harford Fire
Insurance Company after his graduation until his death. Despite not having an education in
linguistics, he became interested in how language may influence thought in his late twenties. As
a result, he developed ties with several prominent linguists of his time including Edward Sapir.
These ties helped him study Native American languages (Whorf & Carroll, 1998).
Whorf’s ideas have been condensed into the linguistic relativity hypothesis. The
hypothesis posits that the language one speaks influences the way one thinks. According to
Whorf, grammar, word frequency and linguistic categories all shape thought. He said, “We
dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages…. The world is presented in a
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means
largely by the linguistic systems in our minds” (Whorf & Carroll, 1998, p. 213). For example,
Whorf argued that in the Hopi language, verbs treat time differently than they do in English.
According to Whorf’s research, brief events that are described in English as nouns (e.g.,
lightning, wave, flame, meteor) are always verbs in Hopi. This is due to the fact that Hopi
1

grammar is more likely to classify nouns and verbs in terms of duration than is English (Whorf
& Carroll, 1998, p.215). Whorf argued that variations in categorization such as the one just
described train speakers to attend to different phenomena and thus think about such events
differently.
Another famous example that is commonly used to explain the linguistic relativity
hypothesis is the fact that certain Eskimo languages have several words for snow. The
phenomenon was first described by Franz Boaz, a German-American anthropologist (Boaz,
1911, pp. 145-146). Whorf claimed that if Eskimos have more than one word for snow, then they
think about snow differently. There has been a lot of debate about whether differences between
languages really do shape thought and perception.
Among those most critical of the linguistic relativity hypothesis are cognitive
psychologists. In my opinion, there are two main reasons why this is the case. First, linguistic
relativity gained in popularity during a time when there were few if any empirical studies that
examined it. When the cognitive revolution took place, many cognitive psychologists naturally
questioned claims about thought that lacked data to back them up. Secondly, cognitive science
deals with finding universal patterns in memory, perception and thought in general. Linguistic
relativity states that cognition may vary based on the language one speaks. Researchers who are
trying to find universal rules may feel challenged by such an idea.
Those who favor a universalist explanation of how thought and language are linked argue
that thinking is more or less independent of language. For example, Noam Chomsky
distinguished between the deep structure and surface structure of grammar. Deep structure refers
to the components of grammar that give an utterance its underlying meaning. Surface structure
refers to the outward manifestation (which is similar to the phonetic expression) of the utterance
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(Chomsky, 1965, p. 17). Chomsky argued that although surface structure may vary across
languages, deep structure does not (Chomsky, 1965, p. 118). In other words, languages are very
similar in terms of the types of rules that govern them, but they are different in how they are
conveyed verbally. To Chomsky, any differences observed between two languages are just
different ways of saying the same thing. If this is true, there would be minimal (if any) influence
of one’s language on cognition.
I aimed to examine how language influences perception and memory in my thesis by
examining the differences in how English and Russian-speakers describe eye color. Russianspeakers are more likely to describe an eye as grey whereas English-speakers are more likely to
describe it as blue. If the linguistic relativity hypothesis is valid, then one would expect the way
the two cultures describe eyes will influence the way they perceive and remember them. It
should be noted that, although this study deals with color perception, Whorf never actually talked
much about color. He was more interested in grammar, how people make categorizations based
on their native language and how those categorizations influence thought.
Nevertheless, there has been a substantial amount of research done on color in an attempt
either to support or refute Whorf’s views. Both opponents and advocates of linguistic relativity
point to different studies that examine color in order to provide evidence for or argue against the
hypothesis. The experiments that have been done are useful in understanding color perception.
However, most were done by using simple Munsell chips or stimuli that are uniform in color
rather than real world objects. My study was an attempt to use stimuli one would find in the real
world to test Whorf’s ideas.

3

Early Cross Cultural Color Studies Favoring Universalism
In order to study how language influences thought, many researchers have studied color.
Color is a common way to study the linguistic relativity hypothesis because the stimuli can be
controlled. In other words, a color can be described objectively in terms of wavelength,
saturation, brightness, etc. Different languages divide color into different categories. At first
glance these categories seem to be culturally specific and non-universal. English has the word
blue, whereas Russian divides blue up into two terms: goluboy (light blue) and siniy (dark blue).
The fact that color categories are partitioned differently across languages supported the idea of
the linguistic relativity hypothesis in the early twentieth century.
Berlin and Kay (1969) were among the first to question whether languages/cultures
divide color into arbitrary categories. They systematically studied color terms across 20 different
languages. Participants were asked to indicate the total number of ‘basic color terms’ their native
language had and where the boundaries were for each basic color term. Basic color terms had to
meet certain criteria: they had be mono-lexemic (e.g., lemon-colored would not be acceptable),
they could not be represented by any other color term (e.g. crimson is a type of red, and therefore
not a basic color term), they could not be restricted to only a narrow class of objects (e.g., blond
is unacceptable) and they had to be psychologically salient, meaning native speakers had to
know what the color terms were and agree that they were indeed major color categories.
Once participants named their language’s basic color terms, they were given a board with
329 standardized color chips that were arranged by hue and brightness. Participants were asked
to indicate every chip that represented each color term as well as the best example of each. The
data indicated that languages categorize colors systematically.
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Despite the fact that one language may have a different number of basic color terms, a
distinct pattern emerged. Each language had at least two color terms. If a language only had two,
then the terms represented black and white. All languages with only three basic color terms had
color categories for black, white, and red. If a language had four color terms, then they divided
the color chips into black, white, red and either yellow or green. Languages with five color terms
categorized colors into black, white, red, yellow and green. If a language had six, then they had
the same categories as languages with five categories but added a blue term. If a language had
seven or more color terms, it had some combination of purple, pink, orange and grey. Berlin and
Kay’s work was influential and helped turn the tide against linguistic relativism to universalism.
A couple of years later, Heider (1972) found that Berlin and Kay’s “basic colors” are
more easily encoded and better remembered across different languages than are “inter-nominal”
or “boundary” colors. Inter-nominal colors are colors that do not fall into any of the basic color
ranges. However, inter-nominal colors were similar in hue, value or saturation to basic color
terms. Boundary colors were those that were adjacent to basic colors. In a series of experiments,
Heider tested several dependent variables including the number of letters colors have, reaction
time for naming colors, and memory for colors. In each experiment a general trend emerged:
regardless of language, basic colors had fewer letters, were named more quickly and were
remembered better than inter-nominal and boundary colors.
Other factors also contributed to universalism gaining popularity. Heider (1971) found
that children chose basic colors more frequently when allowed to choose any color, matched
basic colors better than non-basic ones, and chose basic colors to represent color terms.
Bornstein, Kessen, and Weiskopf (1976) discovered that infants who are habituated to a certain
hue will look at a different hue longer if it comes from a different adult color category than if it
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comes from the same category even if the new colors are equally distant in terms of wavelength
from the original hue. That is, they categorized colors as adults do. For example, the researchers
found that infants who are habituated to a blue hue of 480 nanometers look longer at a green hue
of 510 nm than a darker blue hue of 450 nm. On the basis of such research, linguistic relativity
looked like a flawed hypothesis, at least in terms of color perception. It was replaced with a
universal, neurophysiological explanation that was popular in cognitive science. A quote from
Pinker (1995, p. 136) sums up the “consensus” that was formed:
[The linguistic relativity hypothesis] asserts that the categories and relations that we use
to understand the world come from our particular language, so that speakers of different
languages quite literally conceptualize the world in different ways….This is an intriguing
hypothesis, but virtually all modern cognitive scientists believe it is false.
However, understanding the neurophysiological basis of color perception not only helps one
understand how universal color terms develop, but may also help support the linguistic relativity
hypothesis.
The Neurophysiological Basis of Color Perception
There are three points to be made in this section. The first is to explain the biological
argument behind the universalist explanation of color perception. The second, which may seem
contradictory to the first, is to demonstrate that neurophysiology does not preclude Whorfian
effects on color perception and memory. The third is to demonstrate that even if the differences
in perceiving color are small across cultures, those differences would be significant given the
strong, universal, biological component of color perception.
Biologically speaking, it is difficult to explain how people experience color. Light enters
the eye, is absorbed by light-sensitive cells, gets converted into electrochemical signals and is
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sent to the brain where it is interpreted. However, there is still a ‘black box in our brain’ into
which the signals enter and out of which vision is produced (Kuehni, 2012, p. 23). Despite this,
much is known about the cells and parts of the brain that are involved.
Humans can see wavelengths of light that range roughly from 400 nm to 700 nm. Once
light hits the retina, it passes through several layers of cells, including ganglion cells, amacrine
cells, bipolar cells, rods, and cones (Kuehni, 2012). I only discuss cones in detail here because it
is most responsible for color vision. There are three types of cones, and each type has a different
absorption spectrum (Cornsweet, 2012). In other words, each type has different wavelengths of
light to which they are most sensitive. There is debate as to what to call the types, but for this
thesis they are named L, M, or S in reference to their sensitivities. If one were to label colors
according to wavelength, red would correspond to long wavelengths, green would correspond to
medium wavelengths and blue would correspond to short wavelengths. However, different types
of cones can be activated at the same time. For example, light that creates a response in an L
cone may also create a response in a nearby M cone. (Stone, 2012).
It should be noted at this point that this explanation of color perception is an
oversimplification of what actually happens. Information from all three cones is used in order to
process color. However, it is more complicated than just mixing input from the L, M and S cones.
There appears to be an ‘opponent system.’ Color opponency refers to the fact that output data
from different types of cones are subtracted from each other. There are two ways this happens:
L-M and L+M-S (Kuehni, 2012). These form two color dimensions or channels. The L-M
subtraction creates a color channel of red and green whereas the L+M-S subtraction creates a
color channel of yellow and blue (see Figure 1). In other words, output from specific types of
cones is compared to the output from others. In the L+M-S dimension, the L and M cones are
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compared to S cones. If light hitting the retina is above 500 nm, the yellow side of the dimension
dominates and the blue side is inhibited. In the L+M dimension, green dominates from about 475
nm to 575 nm, while red dominates above and below those values (Kuehni, 2012). The brain
then takes the information from the two channels and perceives other colors. See Figure 1 for a
representation of the two color channels.

Figure 1. A representation of the color component channels.
A couple of points should be made. First, because of the opponent system, some pairs of
colors can never be perceived as being mixed. When the L and M cones activate yellow, blue is
inhibited. Thus, there is no “yellowish-blue” color term or vice versa. The same is true of red and
green. Second, there are four unique hues that correspond to the excitation of only one half of
one color channel. For example, if there is only L cone stimulation, then a unique hue of red is
perceived that one would say is not a mix of any other colors (i.e., it is not perceived as being
reddish-orange, purplish-red, etc.). There are also unique hues for yellow, green and blue where
8

unique yellow is produced by L and M cones being activated with no S cone input, unique green
is created by having only M cone stimulation and unique blue corresponds to only S cone
stimulation. These hues correspond to the colors that make up the two channels (Kuehni, 2012).
As one may have noticed, these are the main four colors (other than black and white) that Berlin
and Kay (1969) found in most languages. Biology certainly plays a role in how colors are
categorized across peoples.
Taken together, it is clear that there is a strong universal neuropsychological component
to color perception. The first colors (after black and white) that are common to most cultures are
red, yellow, green and blue, which match the colors in the two color channels. Additionally,
there are no words for the physiologically impossible hues of yellow-blue or red-green. If
languages arbitrarily create color categories, one would expect to find at least some languages
with such color terms. The fact that they do not exist is evidence that color perception is limited
by biology. However, there is another piece of the puzzle that has not yet been discussed in this
section of the proposal: the brain itself.
The previous description of cone type and color perception seems straightforward. In
reality, there are multiple steps in processing the information in the brain that lead to color
opponency. There is a lot of uncertainty as to the specifics, but in general ganglion cells in the
retina play an important role in creating initial color opponency. Information is then sent to the
lateral geniculate nucleus, the primary visual cortex (V1), the prestriate cortex (V2) and on to
higher visual areas (e.g., extrastriate visual cortex, Visual Area V4), which are responsible for
perceiving color, orientation and movement (Spillmann, 1990, pp. 179-185). It should be noted
that by the time color information reaches the primary visual cortex, initial color opponent
information has been modified, and by the time it reaches V4, color information is averaged
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across cells and combined with brightness information that has been processed separately
(Kuehni, 2012). Complicating matters further is the fact that the brain combines visual
information with previous knowledge about the world. Previous knowledge that is used includes
information from memory and expectations about what one expects to see.
A logical conclusion is that eyes do not see. The brain does. Color is not perceived based
on wavelength alone. For example, the same color may look different depending on the color of
its background. For an example of this, see Figure 2 where the red boxes are the same
wavelength of light, but the ones on the right look lighter than the ones on the left. This happens
because the brain uses the surrounding context in its interpretation of color.

Figure 2. Color illusion where red squares look like different colors.
Color constancy is another phenomenon that demonstrates that the brain does not rely
only on the wavelength of light to perceive color. Color constancy refers to the fact that the color
of an object is perceived the same even if the illuminant changes (Ebner, 2007). For example, an
apple looks red in bright sunlight and under a fluorescent light. Stone (2012, p. 156) pointed out
that what we see follows a simple formula: a perceived image = image data + prior expectations.
If this is true, then one could speculate as to how the language one speaks affects and/or reflects
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one’s prior expectations. If one’s culture describes the color of an object differently than does
another culture, would that affect the perception of that object? What about how one remembers
it? These are questions that are directly related to the linguistic relativity hypothesis and this
thesis.
Problems with the Universalist Approach and Evidence in Favor of the Linguistic
Relativity Hypothesis Regarding Color
It is clear that the brain interprets input from the retina and combines it with prior
expectations. It is unclear whether linguistic information is part of those prior expectations.
However, an important point must be made first: the way Whorf’s hypotheses were framed by
cognitive scientists in the mid and late twentieth century was different than what Whorf actually
proposed. Before one can examine evidence about the linguistic relativity hypothesis, one has to
frame it correctly.
When researchers started criticizing what they called “linguistic relativity” or the “SapirWhorf hypothesis” they made three arguments: linguistic relativity implies that language is
deterministic, it is hermetic, and there can be infinite variability between languages (Leavitt,
2010, pp. 167-168). Determinism refers to the idea that language (and only language) determines
how one thinks and perceives. Hermeticism states that it is impossible to translate from one
language to another because each language has its own unique way of conveying ideas. Infinite
variability is the idea that languages are different from each other in every aspect imaginable
(e.g., how they categorize color, phonemes, grammar). In fact, Whorf never made any of these
arguments. They were extreme positions used in order to strengthen universalism’s claims.
Proverbial straw men were set up that could easily be knocked down by any one of three possible
findings: language is not a prerequisite of thought, one can translate a language into another
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language, or language universals exist. For example, Michaels (1977) oversimplifies Whorf’s
ideas by stating the following:
Whorf’s claims that individual languages structure reality differently seem to fail on his
own evidence. The fact that languages are inter-translatable… suggests that linguistic
relativity reduces simply to the claim that to speak grammatically in any given language
one must use the grammar of that language (p. 333).
The fact of the matter is that such criticism is an oversimplification and misrepresentation of
Whorf’s position. Whorf believed in the universality of cognitive abilities and that one can say
anything one wants to in any language. If people can say whatever they want to in their native
language, then translations are no longer impossible. In reality, the linguistic relativity
hypothesis can be summed up by what Whorf really thought. He believed that different
languages predispose speakers to attend to certain domains over others based on how they
normally convey information, and that is the basis for how language affects thought (Leavitt,
2010). For example, in English there are different ways to describe water. One can talk about
water as rain, dew, snow, ice, mist, steam, hail, frost, and so forth. Each term takes on a specific
meaning, and the way each is used contextually trains native English speakers to notice specific
properties of water that they otherwise may not have detected.
It should also be briefly noted that many researchers did not sufficiently consider
evidence that supported the linguistic relativity hypothesis, and their methods may have been
culturally biased. In Berlin and Kay’s study (1969) on basic color terms, there was substantial
variation in the number of color terms across cultures, and that variation was not studied in
depth. When Heider (1972) published a series of experiments that found basic colors were more
easily encoded and remembered across cultures, she found that Dani speakers were significantly
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worse at remembering colors than English speakers. The memory task consisted of seeing a
uniform colored chip, waiting five seconds and then picking out the color just seen in a 160-chip
array. The fact that they did significantly worse than English speakers is worth mentioning
because the Dani language only has two color terms. In fact, the discrepancy between the two
groups had the largest effect size in the study. One interpretation of these results could be that
having words for the so-called basic color terms aids in perceiving and remembering those
colors. This explanation was not taken seriously by many researchers at the time because Dani
speakers still remembered basic colors better than other hues (such as inter-nominal colors).
The studies also relied on characterizing color by hue and brightness. This may have
biased the results. For example, Conklin (1955) found that Hanunoo, a language spoken in the
Philippines, describes color based on hue, brightness as well as “wetness.” Based on Berlin and
Kay’s criteria, Hanunoo has four basic color terms: black, white, red and light green. However,
since colors also seem to be paired with information about their “wetness,” researchers may be
prone to overlook how those categories are applied in practice. For example, in Hanunoo a shiny,
wet brown colored section of bamboo is labeled as green because it is wet. Theoretically, it
should be described as red because brown is closer in hue to red than green. The important point
here is that if one wants to examine the linguistic relativity hypothesis and color perception
critically, one must look at how language variation affects cognition, and not just how
physiology (e.g., cones in the retina) affects language.
As mentioned previously, the main argument behind linguistic relativity is that one’s
language helps determine what people attend to. If different languages do in fact make speakers
pay attention to certain domains more than others, then there are a number of ways to test this
proposition. Many researchers have turned to how language affects color coding and reaction
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time. Kay and Kempton (1984) were among the first to examine coding, and they were able to
find so-called “Whorfian effects.” They conducted a cross-cultural study between English and
Tarahumara speakers. Unlike English, Tarahumara only has one word for what English speakers
would consider green and blue. Participants were given three colors and asked to pick the one
that was most different. They found that English speakers were more likely to exaggerate the
subjective distances of colors close to the green-blue boundary. In other words, they tended to
say that the overall difference between green and blue was greater than did Tarahumara speakers.
In the past 20 years, there has been a resurgence of researchers examining Whorfian
effects on color. A few are mentioned briefly here. Goldstein, Davidoff and Roberson (2009)
found that English-speaking toddlers did better at recognizing and remembering colors that were
between categories of blue and green than did Himba-speaking children, but only if the toddlers
had blue and green in their vocabulary. It should be noted that Himba does not have green and
blue color terms. This suggests that having specific color terms may aid in memorizing colors of
objects.
Winawer et al. (2007) discovered that Russian speakers were faster than English speakers
at discriminating between light blue and blue (goluboy and siniy in Russian, respectively) in a
reaction time task, but their advantage disappeared when they had to simultaneously do a verbal
task. It should be noted that the Russian color terms for light blue and blue could both be
considered basic color terms based on Berlin and Kay’s criteria, whereas light blue in English
would not be considered a basic color term. Winawer et al. also discovered that Russian
speakers’ advantage returned when doing a non-verbal spatial task. This indicates that language
may aid in perceiving colors because when language resources in the brain were being used (i.e.,
when participants had verbal interference), Russian speakers were slower at discriminating
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between light blue and blue hues. The effect reversed when language resources in the brain were
not used.
Kwok et al. (2011) recorded changes to the visual cortex as Mandarin-speaking
participants were trained to distinguish between four made-up categories over three days. They
observed that there was an increase of grey matter in the V2 and V3 areas of the left visual
cortex, providing a possible structural basis in the brain for Whorfian effects.
Russian and English Descriptions of Eyes
Researchers studying cross cultural color perception have primarily used Munsell color
chips as stimuli for participants. Munsell color chips represent a color space that defines color by
three dimensions: hue, lightness and chroma. Because each color chip is a uniform color, they
are useful in studying categories of color in general and have been used by most of the
researchers mentioned in this introduction. Most researchers gave participants an array of color
chips and had them organize them by color for example. Other researchers had participants
indicate the best example of a color term (e.g., blue). However, I have not found any studies that
looked at how people of different cultures perceive colors of real world objects. In contrast, I
aimed to take the linguistic relativity hypothesis one step further. If it is valid, I would expect
different cultures to think about the color of the same object differently if their languages use
different color terms to describe that object. One just has to find an object that would meet such
criteria.
Fortunately, Russian and English describe eye color differently. Based on my own
experience while living in Russia, I observed that what I describe as a blue eye, many Russians
describe as a grey eye. This led me to believe that the two cultures label the same colored eye
differently in at least some cases. There appears to be some evidence to back up my conclusion.
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Examining how academics study eye color classification is one method of determining
how different cultures describe eye color. In the West, in the early 20th century, Davenport and
Davenport (1907) published an article in Science. In it, they stated that eye color falls into two
categories: blue and brown. They also proposed that blue eyes were recessive to brown. Even
today, many educators in English-speaking schools teach that people with blue eyes have
recessive genes, even though such an explanation is overly simplistic and not entirely correct
(Sturm & Frudakis, 2004). Many anthropological studies of eye color in the U.S. and Europe use
a three-point scale consisting of combinations of blue, green-hazel and brown in order to classify
eye-color (Sturm & Larsson, 2009).
There are major differences in categorizing eye color in Russia. It should be noted that
for much of the 20th century, Russia was under Soviet control and cut off from Europe and the
West. Communication between the two blocs was limited. Soviet researchers often developed
their own methods of doing research, and eye-color classification was no exception. V. V. Banak
was a Russian anthropologist who studied, among other things, eye color. Banak developed a
way to categorize eyes. In his system, there are three main types of eye-color: dark, mixed and
light (Banak, 1965). Each main type is subdivided into categories. For brevity, I will only
consider light colored eyes. Light colored eyes are divided into colors that would be translated
into English as grey, light-blue, greyish light-blue and blue. Banak’s method is still popular in
Russia today. For example, on one of Russia’s main social networking sites VK, there is a page
dedicated to figuring out one’s eye color based on Banak’s scale (WotanJugend - INFO).
Another way to look at differences between native Russian and English speakers in how
they describe eye color is to look at dating sites aimed at Russian-speaking audiences and
compare them to dating sites for English-speaking audiences. In my analysis of over 15 Russian

16

dating sites, seven had an option to specify one’s eye-color. See Table 1 for the eye-color options
found on these Russian dating sites. There were five color options given on those sites: grey,
light-blue, green, brown/hazel and black, which were translated from Russian color terms seriy,
goluboy, zelyoniy, kariy and chyorniy, respectively (in Cyrillic: серый, голубой, зелёный, карий
and чёрный).Of the seven sites, six contained the term grey. Of those six sites, four had grey as
the first or second choice. More than ten English sites were also analyzed. Of those, seven gave
users options to choose eye-color. See Table 2 for the eye color options on dating sites aimed at
English speaking audiences. Of the seven sites, all of them had an option for blue, and five of
them had an option for grey. Of those, blue was always in the first or second position, while grey
never appeared higher than the third position.
Table 1.
Eye color options on Russian Dating Sites
Russian Dating
Website
mylove.ru
ru.fdating.com
badoo.com
loveplanet.ru
rusdate.net
znakomstva.ru
komuza40.ru

1st Option
Grey
Black
Brown/Hazel
Brown/Hazel
Brown/Hazel
Light-Blue
Brown/Hazel

2nd Option
Light-Blue
Grey
Green
Grey
Light-Blue
Green
Grey

Eye Color
3rd Option 4th Option
Green
Brown/Hazel
Light-Blue Green
Light-Blue Grey
Light-Blue Green
Green
Black
Grey
Brown/Hazel
Light-Blue Green

5th Option
Black
Brown
Hazel
N/A
N/A
Dark
N/A

6th Option
Multicolored
Brown/Hazel
Black
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Table 2
Eye color options on English Dating Sites
English Dating
Websites
datehookup.com
pof.com
match.com
chemistry.com
spark.com*
seniorsmeet.com
christianmingle.com

1st Option
Blue
Blue
Black
Black
Blue
Blue
Black

2nd Option
Green
Hazel
Blue
Blue
Blue-Grey
Green
Blue

Eye Color
3rd Option 4th Option
Brown
Hazel
Grey
Green
Brown
Grey
Brown
Green
Blue Green Grey
Hazel
Brown
Brown
Green
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5th Option
N/A
Brown
Green
Grey
Green Grey
Grey
Hazel

6th Option
N/A
N/A
Hazel
Hazel
Turquoise
N/A
Red

Examining word frequencies can also shed light on how speakers of English and Russian
describe eye color. I used the American Corpus (Davies, 2014) to compare two relevant phrases
in English: Blue eyes and grey eyes (the term gray eyes was also included in the search). I
searched the Russian National Corpus (2014) for three terms in Russian: grey eyes, light blue
eyes, and blue eyes. Overall, in U.S. English, the term blue eyes occurred 3577 times and grey
eyes occurred 666 times. In Russian, there were 1569 results for the term grey eyes, 1937 results
for light blue eyes and 697 results for blue eyes. It should be noted that singular and plural forms
of each term for each language were part of each search. Also, Russian is morphologically
complex. The endings change by case (genitive, prepositional, etc.) depending on the noun or
adjective’s role in the sentence. Word order in Russian is flexible as well. To compensate, all
combinations of case and word order are included in the aforementioned results.
There are two possible explanations for the above findings. One is that Russian and
English speakers classify eye-color differently and may perceive and/or remember eye color
differently. The other is that there are genetic differences between speakers of the two languages
and ethnic Russians’ eyes are indeed greyer than native English speakers’. The truth may lie
somewhere in between, and the present study helps answer such questions.
Pilot Study
Although the difference in describing eye color between the two cultures may have a
genetic cause (e.g., ethnic Russians may have eyes that look greyer in general), it is unlikely that
genetics is the only factor in determining how Russians describe eyes. In fact, a quasi-experiment
would help determine whether language influences perception and memory. By providing native
Russian and English speakers a picture of a blue or grey eye along with a color scale, any
difference between the languages would indicate that language may play a role in perception.
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One could also study whether language affects memory of eye color by showing participants the
color scale separately after presenting a picture of an eye, or by having the participants label the
color of an eye and match the color from memory. Having participants label the eye’s color
would theoretically prime them to remember the eye as they described it, which would give
strong evidence of language affecting memory. In a pilot study, I tested these possibilities.
Ninety-seven participants (52 English speakers and 45 Russian speakers) rated the color
of two eyes in one of three conditions: perception, memory, and label. In the perception
condition, participants saw the color scale and eye simultaneously. Participants in the memory
condition had to rate the color of the eye from memory, and the label condition was similar to the
memory condition except those participants were asked to “describe the color of the eye” before
rating the eye’s color.
The results were mixed. Overall there was a main effect of language: Russian speakers
rated the eyes as more grey (see Table 3). However, there was an unexpected interaction: both
language groups were similar in their color rating for the label condition (see Figure 3). There
are a couple of possible explanations for why this happened. The first is that the scale was
flawed. The center of the scale was an estimated average of the eyes’ color. The luminance was
increased by equal intervals on one side while the other side increased in blueness in the same
manner. This may have confounded the results, exaggerating the effects between language
groups. The scale was meant to start from grey and go to blue, but two variables (luminance and
color) were manipulated instead of one. It is therefore hard to know what was determining a
participant’s choice in any one condition, whether it be how light a color looks, or how blue it
looks. A scale that systematically changes both dimensions at the same time to give shades of
blue and grey may be a better choice.
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Table 3
Marginal Means and Other Descriptive Statistics of Pilot Study. Higher numbers indicate more
blue, while lower numbers indicate more grey.
Condition

Language

n

M

Label
Memory

SD Median

Min

Max

English

17

4.59

1.88

English

18

6.06

Perception English

17

Label

Russian

Memory

Skew Kurtosis

4.5

1.5

8.0

0.25

-0.70

2.13

6.0

2.0

9.0

-0.22

-1.36

5.53

2.55

5.5

2.0

9.0

0.03

-1.68

15

5.20

2.19

5.5

1.5

9.0

-0.16

-0.96

Russian

16

3.94

1.81

3.5

2.0

8.5

1.03

0.16

Perception Russian

14

4.25

2.15

4.0

1.0

8.0

0.36

-1.05

Figure 3. Interaction graph of pilot study. Error bars represent standard errors.
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A second problem with the pilot study applies only to the label condition. Participants
were instructed to “describe the color of the eye.” Such instructions prompted both language
groups to be as accurate as possible. In fact, both language groups described the eyes similarly.
Terms like bluish-grey and light-bluish-grey were given. I searched the Russian National Corpus
and American Corpus for such terms, and there were very few results (less than 30 for each
language). It would seem that asking participants in the label condition what category the eye
belonged to rather than having them describe the color may have yielded more language-specific
results.
The pilot study was informative. It provided novel evidence of the linguistic relativity
hypothesis: there was an overall main effect of language. However, the color scale and
instructions for the label group were flawed. These were corrected in the present study.
Objectives and Hypotheses of This Thesis
This study followed the same format as my pilot study, but it corrected its problems and
included more stimuli to increase reliability and control for variables. I hypothesized that there
would be an overall main effect of language on eye color ratings relating to how each language
categorized eyes, which would provide evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Russian
speakers were expected to rate the blue/grey eyes as being greyer on the color scale than would
English speakers. I also expected Russian-speakers to be most different from English-speakers in
the label and memory conditions and least different in the perception condition. I predicted this
because color perception has a strong universal biological component, whereas color memory
may rely more on how one categorizes objects. I did not believe there would be differences in the
way Russian and English speakers rated colors of non-eye objects (e.g., tiles).The results of this
ecologically valid study should help researchers better understand whether languages influence
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how people perceive and remember the world. If the hypotheses are supported by the data, then it
is plausible that language does influence memory and thought.
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Chapter Two
Methods
Participants
Fifty native Russian-speaking participants from St. Petersburg, Russia, and 50 native
English-speaking participants living in central Florida participated in this experiment. All
participants were screened by self-report prior to inclusion in the study for having normal color
vision.
Russian-speaking participants were recruited through snowball sampling of friends and
family during May 2014. The mean age of the Russian speaking participants was 29.80 years
(SD=10.35). 32 of these Russian speaking participants were women and 18 were men. Ages
ranged from 18 to 60 years old.
English-speaking participants were recruited either through snowball sampling or through
the University of South Florida Student Psychology Participant Pool from May 2014–October
2014. The mean age of the English speaking participants was 25.58 (SD=10.83). Ages ranged
from 18 to 60 years old. 29 of the English speaking participants were women and 21 were men.
Participants recruited through the USF participant pool were given one point of extra credit that
they could apply to one of their psychology courses.
Materials
Stimuli. 32 pictures were presented to participants. 16 were pictures of various eyes. The
eyes in each of the pictures were centered and zoomed in on. Of the 16 eye pictures, 10 were
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blue (or grey) eyes, and six were brown eyes. The six brown eyes were included as foils to mask
the intent of the study. See Figure 4 for an example of an eye picture used in the experiment.
The remaining 16 pictures were of tiles. Each picture contained nine tiles, eight of which
were white that surrounded a colored tile in the center. The color of each center tile was set to
match the color of one of the eye images as follows: The color of the center tile was calculated
by sampling 10 pixels from its corresponding eye and averaging them together. I chose each
pixel at random using PicPick software. The 10 tiles associated with blue eyes were used as a
control for how participants perceive and remember color. The six tiles associated with brown
eyes served to mask the intent of the study. See Figure 4 for an example of a tile used in the
experiment.

Figure 4. An example of an eye used in the study on the left, and its corresponding tile
used as a control on the right

Response Scale. Participants were required to respond using a color scale comprised of a
grid of color tiles. Two different response scale grids were presented to determine how
participants perceived and remembered the color of the stimuli based on whether the eyes (and
corresponding tiles) were blue/grey or brown. Each response scale consisted of 121 colors
arranged in an 11x11 grid. 10 pixels from each picture were sampled from each eye and their
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CIELAB values were determined. CIELAB is a color space that defines color based on three
values: L, A and B. L refers to luminance, A corresponds with red and green (negative values
indicate green, while positive values indicate red) and B corresponds to blue and yellow
(negative values indicate blue while positive values indicate yellow) (Kuehni, 2003).
Once each pixel’s color was defined in CIELAB color space for each picture, averages
were computed. The average CIELAB color space values of the blue eyed pictures were then
used as the center of the 11x11 color scale for the blue/grey eyes (and their corresponding tiles).
The same procedure was done for the brown eyes, except samples of pixels from brown eyes
were taken.
CIELAB is an approximately uniform color space, meaning that uniform increases in the
L, A or B components correspond to uniform changes in perceived color ("CIE 1976 L*a*b*
colour space"). Thus, in order to make intervals on the blue scale relatively equal, the B or L
components were increased or decreased from the center. Colors that were below the center of
the blue eye color scale increased in the B component by a fixed amount, increasing blueness.
Colors above the center decreased in the B component by fixed amount, making shades of grey.
Colors to the right of the center increased in the L component, and colors to the left of the center
decreased in the L component. The brown scale was created in a similar fashion, except both the
A and B components changed along the vertical dimension to create shades of brown. See Figure
5 for an example of both scales.
Apparatus. A 15.6-inch Dell 1564 laptop with an LED screen was used to present
stimuli and response scales. Participants recorded their responses using a mouse and the laptop’s
keyboard. Stimuli and response scales were presented on OpenSesame software (Mathôt &
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Theeuwes, 2012). The laptop was always plugged in to an outlet, and the same display settings
were used for each participant.

Figure 5. An example of the blue color scale (R) and brown color scale (L).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a perception condition
(n=32), memory condition (n=34) and label condition (n=34). I tested each Russian participant
individually in St. Petersburg, Russia in various locations. I tested each Russian speaker in
Russian. English speakers were tested in a lab setting at the University of South Florida or in his
or her home, and each was tested in English. Participants first read instructions on the computer
in either Russian or English, depending on one’s native language. The stimuli and response
scales were presented in a dark room after I was sure they understood the procedure. Stimuli
were randomized and presented to participants in the same order each time. Participants were
asked to match the color of part of a stimulus (e.g., the iris of the eye for the eye pictures or
middle color of the tile pictures) to the picture’s corresponding color scale. The color scale was
presented either with the stimulus or after it depending on condition.
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In the perception condition, participants saw each picture and color scale simultaneously
and were asked to indicate which color on the scale best represented the color of the eye or tile.
Pictures of the eyes and tiles were presented on the left half of the screen and color scales were
presented on the right. In order to pick a color, participants clicked on the color scale with the
mouse. They had as much time as they wanted to respond.
Participants in the memory condition looked first at the stimuli. Stimuli were presented in
the middle of the screen. They had as much time as they needed to memorize the color of the
stimuli. Participants then pressed the space bar with their left hand and a blank screen was
presented for 2500 milliseconds. They then saw the response scale and were asked to indicate
what color on it best represented the previous stimulus. In order to pick a color, participants
clicked on the color on the color scale with the mouse. The response scale was also centered on
the screen. They had as much time as they needed to respond.
The label group followed the same procedure as the memory condition, except the blank
screen that was presented between the stimulus and color scale was replaced with a screen with
the phrase “Color Category?” centered in the middle that lasted 2500ms. Participants viewed the
eye or tile and pressed the space bar. After the eye/tile picture disappeared, participants orally
responded by saying what color category the eye or color in the middle tile belonged to.
Participants were told to say whatever first came to mind. Oral responses were recorded, and
participants then matched the color of the eye/tile to the scale from memory.
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Chapter Three
Results
Descriptive Analyses
Data were calculated by averaging each participant’s responses on the blue color scale for
the 10 blue/grey eyes and their corresponding tiles. Because I was interested in the blue–grey
dimension, only the vertical dimension of the blue color scale (see Figure 5) was used. Colors on
the top row were coded 1, colors on the row immediately below it were coded 2, and so forth
through 11. Therefore, if a participant matched an eye or tile to a color in the top row, the score
for that item would be one. All in all, there were 20 data points for each participant (10 data
points for the eyes and 10 for their corresponding tiles). 18 pairs of data points out of the 2000
total data points were removed due to participant error (e.g., clicking or pressing the space bar
too quickly resulting in not seeing a stimulus). Overall, internal reliability of the 10 individual
responses for the blue eyes was good, α = 0.84. Having good internal reliability indicates that the
mean of the ten items is a good measure of how participants were rating the eyes in general.
Means, standard deviations and other descriptive statistics are given in Table 4 on page 30.
Responses for how participants in the label condition categorized the eyes were recorded.
Three responses from each language group were discarded due to participant error (e.g., clicking
or pressing the space bar too quickly resulting in not seeing a stimulus). Responses were coded
as blue, grey or other. All blue or grey responses contained only one color term (i.e., grey but not
blue-grey), but they may have been paired with an adjective describing lightness (e.g., light-blue
or dark-grey). For Russian participants goluboy and siniy were both coded as blue because they
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both fall under the term blue in English. Responses coded as other either contained one color
term unrelated to blue or grey (e.g., green) or a combination of color terms (e.g., bluish-green).
89 percent of English-speaking responses were blue, 9 percent were grey and 1 percent were
other. 50 percent of Russian responses were blue, 49 percent were grey and less than one percent
were other. It should be noted that most Russian blue labels were the Russian word goluboy,
meaning light blue.
Demographic Analyses
Demographic information on gender and age were collected from participants. To assess
whether the proportion of males and females differed across languages, a 2 (language) x 2
(gender) chi square analysis was used, and no significant difference was found, χ2(1,
N=100)=0.38, p=.54. Two 3 (condition) x 2 (language) chi square analyses were also used to
determine whether the proportion of males and females was different across each level of the
independent variables. The number of males did not significantly differ across conditions, χ2(2,
N=100) = 0.11, p=.94, and neither did the number of females, χ2(2, N=100) = 0.13, p=.94. A 3
(condition) x 2 (language) ANOVA was used to analyze age differences across conditions. The
main effect of language approached significance, F(1,94) =3.81, p=.05. English speakers
(M=25.58, SD=10.83) were younger than Russian speakers (M=29.80 years, SD=10.35).
However, the correlation between age and mean blue tile rating was not significant, r(98)=-0.10,
p=.34. There was no main effect of condition, F(,94) =0.43, p=.65, and there was no interaction,
F(2,94) =0.79, p=.50.
Tests of Predictions
In order to determine whether English speakers were more likely to describe an eye as
blue than Russian speakers, the total number of blue responses was summed for each participant.
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Table 4.
Means and Other Descriptive Statistics for Eyes and Tiles.
Higher means indicate more blue, while lower numbers indicate more grey.
English

Stimulus

Eye

Tile

Russian

Total

Condition

n

M

SD

Kurt

n

M

SD

Kurt

n

M

SD

Kurt

Perception

16

7.62

0.98

0.50

16

7.64

1.05

-1.53

32

7.62

1.00

-0.50

Memory

17

7.13

1.28

-0.39

17

6.42

1.99

-0.42

34

6.78

1.69

0.43

Label

17

6.95

1.38

-0.86

17

6.33

1.62

0.06

34

6.64

1.51

-0.20

Total

50

7.23

1.24

0.04

50

6.78

1.68

0.19

100

7.00

1.49

0.64

Perception

16

6.06

0.75

0.30

16

6.05

0.83

-0.40

32

6.06

0.78

0.11

Memory

17

5.46

0.66

-0.97

17

5.68

0.90

-0.59

34

5.57

0.79

0.13

Label

17

5.22

1.08

0.58

17

5.9

1.11

-0.84

34

5.56

1.13

-0.25

Total

50

5.57

0.91

0.70

50

5.87

0.95

-0.39

100

5.72

0.94

0.19
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Overall, Russian speakers used blue as a label less (M=5.00, SD=3.30) than did English speakers
(M=8.71, SD= .91). An independent samples t-test where language group was the independent
variable (equal variance was not assumed) was used to analyze these data, and a significant
difference for how the language groups categorized eyes was found, t(18.92)=4.44, p<.001.
In order to assess whether Russian and English speakers perceive or remember shades of
grey or blue differently in general, a 3 (condition) x 2 (language) factorial ANOVA was used to
analyze mean blueness ratings of the 10 tiles. There was no main effect of language,
F(1,94)=2.65, p=0.11, nor was there an interaction, F(2,94)=1.25, p=0.29. There was a main
effect of condition, F(2,94)=3.19, p=0.04. A Tukey HSD test was used to analyze this main
effect. The largest mean difference was between the label and perception conditions. Participants
in the perception condition rated the tiles as more blue (M=6.06, SD = 0.78) than did participants
in the label condition (M=5.56, SD = 0.94), and the difference approached significance (p=.07).
Refer to Figure 6 on page 35 for a graph of mean tile ratings.
A 3 (condition) x 2 (language) ANCOVA with participants’ mean blue tile ratings of the
participants as the covariate was used to analyze blueness ratings for the 10 blue/grey eye
pictures. There were two reasons an ANCOVA was chosen. First, it increased power. It
controlled for how participants perceived and remembered eye color by removing error variance
for how they perceived and remembered color in general. Second, it more directly addressed the
predictions than a 3 (condition) x 2 (language) x 2 (type of picture) repeated measures ANOVA.
Overall, there was a main effect of language, F(1,93)=4.71, p=0.03, ƞp2=.05, d=.44. There was
no main effect for condition, F(2,93)=2.47, p=0.09, ƞp2=.05, nor was there an interaction
F(2,93)=2.38, p=0.28, ƞp2=.03. The ANCOVA can then be used to find adjusted cell means.
Adjusted cell means are estimates of each group’s blue eye mean if all participants had the same
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mean blue tile rating. The adjusted means are shown in Figure 8 on page 37(the means are
evaluated at a mean blue tile rating of 5.72; they are estimates of what the mean of each
condition would be if each participant rated the blue tiles as 5.72 on average). It should be noted
that all the assumptions of ANCOVA were met. First, the covariate was correlated with the
dependent variable (r=.34, p<.01). Second, the slopes did not significantly differ between
conditions (see Figure 7 on page 36). This was tested by running a customized ANCOVA model
examining all possible interactions between the covariate and dependent variables. No
interactions differed between any combination of independent variables and the covariate (see
Table 5 on page 36). Third, homogeneity of variance was not violated; a Levene’s test of
equality of variances was not significant, F(5,94)=1.25, p=0.29.
Exploratory Analyses
The data were input into a Bayesian model that used Gibbs sampling based on work by
Kruschke (2010). Bayesian analyses have several advantages over traditional analytic methods.
First, they calculate the probability of the model based on the data and the model’s assumptions
rather than the probability of obtaining data given the hypothesis. In other words, instead of
testing the validity of the null hypothesis, they calculate how probable values of the parameter of
interest are based on the data. Second, they are not dependent on how many statistical analyses
are planned. In traditional null hypothesis significance testing, the family-wise error rate
increases as the number of tests increase. This problem led to the development of post-hoc
analyses (e.g., Tukey HSD). In Bayesian analyses, the inclusion of prior information and
shrinkage of parameter estimates through the process of Gibbs sampling mitigates this problem.
For example, the ANCOVA used to analyze the data obtained in this study yielded a significant
main effect of language. It did not reveal a main effect of condition or interaction. It is not
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recommended to do pariwise comparisons with null hypothesis significance testing when there
are non-significant effects. This is not true of Bayesian analyses, in which one examines all data
available because error rates are not inflated.
The Bayesian model used was analogous to ANCOVA and the general linear model
insofar as it looked at how predictor variables influenced a dependent variable while controlling
for a covariate. It was hierarchical and examined how each independent variable and
combination of independent variables changed the grand mean of the data. The model assumed
that an individual score, nested within a condition or combination of conditions, came from a
normal distribution and standard deviation. The mean blue score of the eye pictures (y) of any
level of any combination of the independent variables was allowed to vary based on the
following model: y =

+ ⃗ ⃗ + ⃗ ⃗ + ⃗

+ ⃗ ⃗ , where ⃗ and ⃗ are the nominal

⃗

predictors (language and condition respectively), ⃗
and ⃗ is the covariate (mean blue tile score).

is the interaction between those predictors

is the grand mean, and ⃗ , ⃗ , ⃗

and ⃗ are

deflections of the independent variables (i.e., estimates of how much an independent variable
changes the grand mean

).

This Bayesian model required priors for each deflection (i.e., a prior belief as to how the
deflections affect the grand mean). The priors on the deflections were based on normal
distributions with a mean of zero. The standard deviations of those normal distributions were
taken from gamma distributions where the shape and rate parameters were estimated based on a
hierarchal prior (a gamma distribution with shape and rate parameters equal to one). In other
words, the priors indicate a belief that there are no main or interaction effects. In order to
estimate the values of the deflections, the model combines the probabilities provided by the
priors and the probability of the actual data (i.e., the likelihood) to come up with a posterior
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distribution for each level of each deflection. If most of the density (95%) of a posterior
distribution (i.e., the highest density interval or HDI) of a deflection at any level of an
independent variable does not include zero, then the deflection is deemed credible. It can be
concluded that the corresponding independent variable had an effect on the dependent variable. It
should be noted that, unlike null hypothesis significance testing, homogeneity of variance is not
assumed (and didn’t need to be). Overall, the grand mean was estimated to be 7.02. There was a
credible deflection of the perception condition of 0.41, and a credible deflection due to language
of 0.27 for English and -0.27 for Russian (see Figure 9 on page 37).
The above model was then used to estimate pairwise differences to see if the means of
conditions are credibly different from each other. No adjustments needed to be made that would
change power (i.e., Bonferroni corrections, Tukey HSD etc) because Bayesian analyses mitigate
false alarms by incorporating prior beliefs. As a consequence there is shrinkage of parameter
estimates (e.g., deflection estimates). In this model, it means the deflection estimates (and
therefore mean differences) are closer to zero than they otherwise would have been had there
been no priors (Kruschke, 2010). With this in mind, I was able to estimate the difference
between means of the language groups (see Figure 10 on page 38), conditions (see Figure 11)
and all combinations of language and condition (see Figure 12). A difference between means is
significant if the 95% highest density interval does not include zero. According to the analysis,
several means were credibly different. Russian-speakers rated the eyes 0.55 points greyer than
English-speakers. Participants in the perception condition rated eyes 0.77 points bluer than the
label condition. Russian-speakers in the label condition rated the eyes 0.94 points greyer than
English-speakers in the memory condition, 1.16 points greyer than English speakers in the
perception condition, and 1.14 points greyer than other Russian-speakers in the perception
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condition. Finally, Russian speakers in the memory condition rated the eyes 0.97 and 0.95 points
greyer than English and Russian speakers respectively in the perception condition. Within the
label condition, there was almost a credible difference between Russian and English speakers
(Russian-speakers rated the eyes 0.87 points greyer). There was virtually no difference between
language groups in the perception condition
.

Figure 6. Means for blue tile ratings across conditions. Error bars represent standard
errors
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Table 5.
Model testing the relationship between the covariate (mean blue tile score) and dependent
variable (mean blue eye score) at each level of the independent variables.
Source

df

MS

F

p

1.74
2.39
19.25
1.14
1.19

2
1
1
2
1

.88
2.39
19.25
.57
1.19

.46
1.28
10.29
.31
.64

.63
.26
<.01
.74
.43

3.23

2

1.62

.86

.43

168.41

90

1.87

Mean Eye Blueness Rating

Mean Eye Blueness Rating

Condition
Language
Mean Tile Score
Condition x Mean Tile Score
Language x Mean Tile Score
Condition x Language x Mean Tile
Score
Error

SS

Mean Tile Blueness Rating

Mean Tile Blueness Rating

Mean Tile Blueness Rating

Figure 7. Regression slopes of the dependent variable and covariate at all levels.
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Condition
Figure 8. Adjusted mean estimates from the ANCOVA model. Error bars represent
standard errors

Figure 9. Estimates of deflections at each level of the independent variable.
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Figure 10. Mean difference of blue eye ratings between Russian and English speakers

Figure 11. Mean differences of blue eye ratings between conditions

Figure 12. Mean differences of blue eye ratings for all levels of language and condition.
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Chapter Four
Discussion
The overall goal of the study was to examine in an ecologically valid way how language
influences thought. This was done by taking an object (i.e., a blue eye) that is described
differently in two languages and seeing how that description affected participants’ perception
and memory. It was hypothesized that Russian-speaking participants would rate blue/grey eyes
as being greyer than would English-speaking participants. If Russian speaking participants did
so, then the linguistic relativity hypothesis would be supported. It was also hypothesized that the
smallest difference between the English and Russian-speakers would be in the perception
condition because color perception has such a strong universal biological component.
The underlying assumption of the study was that English speakers are more likely to
describe an eye as blue, whereas Russian speakers are more likely to describe the same eye as
grey. The data suggest this is the case. Overall, Russian speakers were less likely to label the
eyes as blue. Participants were viewing the same stimuli, yet eye labeling was different between
the two languages.
The results also suggest that there are no major differences in how Russian and English
speakers perceive and remember shades of grey and blue when not associated with an eye. The
fact that there was no main effect of language or an interaction between language and condition
for mean blue tile ratings supports this conclusion. This also means that the results are not
confounded by how the two language groups perceive and remember color in general.
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Additionally, the fact that each tile’s color was based on an eye’s mean color suggests that colors
found specifically in eyes don’t affect eye ratings.
Interpreting how participants perceived and remembered eye color is more complicated.
There are two approaches that are valid. The first is to analyze results from the ANCOVA, and
the second is to analyze the Bayesian results.
As hypothesized, Russian speakers generally rated the 10 eyes as greyer than did English
speakers. Based on the ANCOVA, there was only a main effect of language. The effect size was
moderate. There was no main effect of condition or interaction between condition and language.
Because there was only a main effect of language, I could conclude that language does influence
thought, both perceptually and through memory for specific objects (e.g., eyes). In other words,
one may be tempted to conclude that languages that categorize objects using different colors
actually see the colors of those objects differently. This is based on the fact that there was no
main effect of language for the tiles but there was for the eyes. Such a conclusion would be
interesting if true, but it seems precarious at best. For example, one could argue that the study
was underpowered, and instead point to the fact that there was virtually no difference between
Russian and English speakers in the perception condition in how blue or grey they rated the eyes.
A study with more participants may yield a significant interaction. Because of this possibility,
the Bayesian analysis was conducted.
The Bayesian analysis offered more insight. In fact, it may be a more valid way of
analyzing the data because it does not estimate the probability of the data given the hypothesis,
but rather tests the hypothesis given the data. In addition, many of the assumptions needed in null
hypothesis testing do not apply. Consequently, a more nuanced picture emerged by using the
Bayesian analysis to calculate all possible pairwise differences. The results suggest there was
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indeed a main effect of language. Russian speakers rated the blue/grey eyes as greyer than did
English speakers. This finding supports the linguistic relativity hypothesis generally. The data
also suggest that there was an interaction because there was no difference between Russian
speakers and English speakers in the perception condition. This second finding supports
universalism.
A more in-depth examination of mean differences between conditions among each
language group makes interpreting the results more complicated. As expected, Russian-speaking
participants rated the eyes greyer in the label and memory conditions than in the perception
condition. This finding suggests that the way language codes a stimulus (i.e., the color of an eye)
affects how the stimulus is recalled. In contrast, there was no difference among English speakers
in how they rated the eyes across conditions. The pattern observed among English speakers is
intriguing, and there are several conclusions that can be made, some more valid than others.
First, it may be evidence that language does not influence thought. Because Russian speakers in
the memory and label conditions remembered eyes as greyer than did Russian speakers in the
perception condition, one might expect the English speakers to rate the eyes as more blue in the
memory and label conditions than in the perception condition. Because this was not the case, one
may be tempted to conclude that the differences found among Russians happened by chance, and
that language and thought are unrelated. However, the overall main effect of language supports
the linguistic relativity hypothesis, making this first possibility unlikely. Second, it may indicate
that it was incorrect to conclude from the Bayesian analysis that there was an interaction.
Perhaps there is only a main effect of language, and similarities between the Russian and English
participants in the perception condition happened by chance. Third, there could be a ceiling
effect because the bluest colors on the color scale were not believable to participants as possible
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eye colors, regardless of language. If there was such a ceiling effect, then English speakers were
limited by the functionally truncated scale, and therefore couldn’t rate the eyes any bluer.
What general conclusions can then be made from the data? The first is that Russian and
English speakers differ in how they describe blue/grey eyes. English-speakers tend to use blue
terms, whereas Russian speakers use both blue and grey terms. The second is that Russians tend
to rate blue/grey eyes greyer than do English-speaking participants. This is supported by both the
ANCOVA and Bayesian model. There is disagreement in the models as to whether there is an
interaction. The ANCOVA suggests there is not, whereas the Bayesian analysis indicates that
there may be one. If there is an interaction, then there is evidence for both universalism and the
linguistic relativity hypothesis in terms of color perception and color memory. Thus, language
may have more influence in how colors of objects are retrieved from memory than how they are
actually perceived. This difference could be explained by the fact that language directs attention
to certain characteristics about a stimulus (e.g., the grey or blue colors in an eye). Russians may
focus more on the grey colors in an eye than English speakers do. This makes Russian-speakers
more likely to remember grey colors from the eye. However, when participants from both
language groups are given the opportunity to match a color to an eye at the same time as they
perceive the eye, input from the cones in the retina is the deciding factor when participants make
their choice.
There are several limitations to this study. The first and foremost is that language is a
grouping variable, not a true independent variable. Several uncontrolled factors could have
influenced how the Russian participants remembered the eyes. For example it could be that
Russians answer surveys differently than Americans because of cultural differences. However,
language is a more parsimonious answer. In addition, the ANOVA testing how the independent
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variables affect the tile ratings showed that Russian and American participants did not differ in
their responses. If confounds affected how the language groups are reporting color, one would
expect them to affect all stimuli equally.
The second limitation is sample size. Originally, I had aimed for 200 total participants. I
found as many Russian participants as was feasible given the resources and time available.
Nevertheless, more participants would have increased power. Because more data increase
confidence in one’s results, the fact that there were only 16-17 people in each condition per
language group decreases certainty. Thus, it is possible that the main effect of language is
spurious, or it is possible that the interaction would have been significant in the ANCOVA
model. Further follow up studies are needed to see if the results are replicable.
The third main limitation is the fact that the laptop used to show stimuli was not ideal.
The LED display changes contrast depending on the angle viewed. However, I was careful to
monitor participants and make sure the viewing angle was similar and they were seated the same
distance away from the monitor. Moreover, the LED display is not a confound. All participants
were tested in a dark room on the same computer using the same settings. Any complications
resulting from the display would have affected all participants. It is a limitation because it may
have increased error variance, resulting in less sensitivity, especially in finding a significant
interaction.
The last limitation is related to the tile stimuli. First, in retrospect, it would have been
better to have sampled more pixels from each of the eyes in order to create a better average color
for the tiles. This would also have increased the accuracy of each eye’s estimated average color,
made the scale more accurately reflect the average color of the eyes and may have increased the
correlation between the eyes and tiles. Second, the tile stimuli were solid colors, whereas the
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irises were not. There are multiple colors in each eye. Further research is needed to assess how
Russian and English-speakers process multi-colored stimuli. It could be that Russian and English
speakers remember multi-colored stimuli differently. Thus, the main effect found would not have
been due to language, but would have been due to differences in how the two cultures perceive
and remember multi-colored objects.
Conclusion
The legitimacy of the linguistic relativity hypothesis has been debated in psychology for
decades. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists have argued against it (Berlin & Kay, 1969;
Pinker, 1995). They have contended that cognitive processes, such as color perception, are
unaffected by one’s language. On the other hand, recent research suggests that color categories
may affect color recognition (Goldstein, Davidoff & Roberson, 2009; Kwok et al., 2011;
Winawer et al., 2007). The present study gives novel, ecologically valid evidence for the
linguistic relativity hypothesis. The overall main effect of language, supported by both the
ANCOVA and Bayesian analysis, suggests that language affects thought. A plausible
explanation for why this happens is that language directs people to pay attention to certain
characteristics of stimuli. Since Russian speakers are more likely than English speakers to
describe eyes using grey terms, they may focus more on grey colors in eyes than English
speakers do. This may make them more likely to remember eyes as being greyer than English
speakers. Conversely, English speakers may focus on blue colors in eyes more than Russian
speakers do. If language does direct attention, then it is not surprising that a main effect of
language was found.
The Bayesian analysis offers further insight. Those results support the ideas of
universalism because there was virtually no difference in how Russian and English speakers
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rated eyes in the perception condition. This is what one would expect given the strong biological
component of color perception. It would also suggest that there is a limit to how much language
can affect thought. Language most affected how the color of the eyes was remembered and not
how they were perceived.
In conclusion, this study suggests that there may be a compromise between universalism
and the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Both ideas consider how thought and language interact.
Universalism claims that cognition is independent of language. The linguistic relativity
hypothesis states that thought and language are closely linked, and that the language one speaks
influences how one thinks. Based on results from this study, the truth may lie somewhere in the
middle. In terms of color, language influences memory the most and perception the least. Thus,
blue may be in the eye of Russian speakers, but not their memory.
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